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Abstract. One of the central questions addressed in the project READY was that
of how a system can automatically recognize situationally determined resource
limitations of its user—in particular, time pressure and cognitive load. This chap-
ter summarizes most of the work done in READY on this topic, presenting as
well some previously unpublished results. We ﬁrst consider why on-line recog-
nition or resource limitations can be useful by discussing the ways in which a
system might adapt its behavior to perceived resource limitations. We then sum-
marize anumber of approaches tothe recognition problem that havebeen taken in
READY and other projects, before focusing on one particular approach: the analy-
sis of features of a user’s speech. In each of two similarly structured experiments,
we created four experimental conditions that varied in terms of whether the user
was (a) required to produce spoken utterances quickly or not; and (b) navigating
within a simulated airport terminal or standing still.In the second experiment, ad-
ditional distraction was caused by continuous loudspeaker announcements. The
speech produced by the experimental subjects (32 in each experiment) was coded
in terms of 7 variables. We report on the extent to which each of these variables
was inﬂuenced by the subjects’ resource limitations. We also trained dynamic
Bayesian networks on the resulting data in order to see how well the information
in the users’ speech could serve as evidence as to which condition the user had
been in. The results yield information about the accuracy that can be attained in
this way and about the diagnostic value of some speciﬁc features of speech.
1 Introduction
The project READY (1996–2004) approached the topic of resource-adaptive cognitive
processes from a different angle than most of the other projects represented in this
⋆ The research described here was supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG) in its
Collaborative Research Center on Resource-Adaptive Cognitive Processes, SFB 378, Projects
B2 (READY) and A2 (VEVIAG). Preparation of this manuscript was supported by the
Province of Trento in its targeted research unit Prevolution (code PsychMM). The research
beneﬁted greatly from preparatory studies by Andr´ e Berthold ([1]) and from advice by Werner
Tack. Some results concerning Experiment 1 were described in a conference paper by M¨ uller
et al. ([2]).volume: The resources in question were the cognitive resources of computer users; the
adaptation was done by the system that they were using.
The type of system focused on in the research was mobile conversational systems,
for reasons that will become clear below. The resource limitations of interest concerned
the user’s available time and working memory.
Since it would be impractical to discuss all of the lines of research in the project
within a single chapter, this chapter will focus on one issue that was addressed in a
number of studies over a period of several years, including one study whose results
have not been published previously: the issue of how a system can estimate the time
pressure and cognitive load of its user, in particular on the basis of evidence in the
user’s behavior with the system, such as their speech.
In passing, we will also mention some of the related work in the READY project,
as well as other related research. Other aspects of the research in READY, especially
concerning the use of probabilistic methods for user modeling, are discussed in the
chapter by Wittig in this volume.
1.1 Reasons for Variation in Cognitive Load and Time Pressure
One salient issue in the design of mobile conversational interfaces is the role of situ-
ationally determined resource limitations of the user—speciﬁcally, time pressure and
cognitive load.
Compared with the users of stationary interactive systems, mobile users are more
likely to be experiencing environmentally induced cognitive load. The user U’s atten-
tion to the environment may be due simply to distracting stimuli in the environment
(as when U is being driven in a taxicab while using the systemS);5 but often U will
be attending actively to the environment while performing actions in it (e.g., handling
objects or navigating through the environment).The tendency of users to attend to their
environment and to multitask may be even greater with conversational mobile systems
than with those that do not use speech as a communication channel, because of the
largely eyes-free and hands-free character of speech.
Although users of stationary systems can of course also experience time pressure,
especially acute time pressure can arise when a conversational interface is used during
interaction with other persons or the environment. For example, a driver may want to
complete a task while waiting at a stoplight; or a user may be interacting with another
person who herself has little time available.
Research on how designers of technical devices can take situationally determined
resource limitations into account has a long tradition in the ﬁeld of engineering psy-
chology (see, e.g., [3]). In the airplane cockpit, the automobile, or the nuclear power
plant, the importance of factors like mental load and time pressure is too obvious to
be overlooked. The research of this sort that seems most directly relevant to mobile
conversationalsystems is research on in-car systems for drivers (see, e.g., [4]; [5]). The
adventofconversationalsystems fordrivershasbeenmotivatedlargelybytheperceived
fundamental compatibility of speech with the task of driving (see, e.g., [6]).
5 To simplify exposition, we will use the symbols S and U to denote a system and its user,
respectively.about time for me to
head on off to ...
Gate C38 ....
Well, uh, I guess it’s
Get something to eat
Get something to read
Look for a present
Where’s
Gate C38?!
?
Would you like to do
anything on the way?
Fig.1. Example of how a user’s current resource limitations can call for different system re-
sponses. (Each of the two screens shown is a possible system response to the user’s input utter-
ance.)
With other types of mobile conversational interface, research on the role of user
resource limitations is still in a relatively early stage. But it would be inappropriate to
neglect them. Consider, for concreteness, the example of a conversational system that
serves as an assistant to a traveler in a large airport, answering questions and providing
guidance. Figure 1 illustrates how quite different system behaviors may be appropriate
given different user resource limitations.
1.2 Why Automatic Adaptation?
There are, of course, straightforward ways of ensuring that a system shows appropriate
behaviors in cases like this. First, the user could be allowed to specify explicitly what
type of system response they prefer—forexample, by includingin the spoken querythe
requestforaresponsethatcontainsonlytheminimallynecessaryinformation.But espe-
cially when the user’s resources are limited, such explicit speciﬁcation may require too
much mental effort and/or time. Second, the designers of the system can try to ensure
that its basic design makes it highly usable even given severe resource limitations—for
example, by providing only simple displays such as the lower one in Figure 1. But a
design that is well suited for one particularcombinationof resource limitations may not
be well suited to a different combination, or to a situation in which there are no signiﬁ-
cant limitations. For example,the minimalistic output on the lower screen in Figure 1 is
unlikelyto beoptimalforthe seconduser. Andeventhe userexperiencingtime pressure
might prefer a different type of display if he is not also experiencing cognitive load.
One possible approach to this dilemma is to give the system some capability to rec-
ognize the user’s resource limitations automatically and to adapt to them with some
degree of autonomy. In the next section, we will give some further examples of how
this type of adaptation can be appropriate. Section 3 will then consider the ﬁrst ques-tion that this approach raises—How can a system automatically recognize resource
limitations?—givinganoverviewofpossiblemethods.Againstthisgeneralbackground,
the remaining major sections of the paper will present speciﬁc empirical results and
analyses concerning the role of the user’s speech as a source of evidence on which
adaptation to resource limitations can be based.
2 Possible Forms of Adaptation
Let us suppose in this section that a mobile conversational interface S is capable of
making some reasonably accurate estimate of the user U’s resource limitations at a
given moment. How might S make use of this assessment to generate more appropriate
system behavior? If there are no plausible answers to this question, there is little point
in investigating techniques for assessing resource limitations.
2.1 Interruption of Communication
Perhaps the simplest form of adaptation is for S simply to stop communicating with U
when S perceives resource limitations. For example, [5] describes a prototype conver-
sational in-car navigation system that interrupts its speech output whenever the driver
applies the brakes. The goal is that in critical trafﬁc situations, U should be able to de-
vote their full attention to the driving task. In effect, the depression of the brake pedal
is being interpreted as an indicator of high cognitive load.
2.2 Timing and Form of Notiﬁcations
Someconversationalsystems spontaneouslypresentnotiﬁcationstousers. Forexample,
the wearable NOMADIC RADIO ([7]) transmits audio messages (such as voice mail) to
the user in a context-sensitive fashion. Although NOMADIC RADIO does not explicitly
modelU’s cognitiveload or time pressure,it does take into accountrelated factors, such
as whether U is currently interacting with S and whether U is in a meeting. In addition
to postponing notiﬁcations, the system can choose from several forms of notiﬁcation
that have different degrees of obtrusiveness.
Other notiﬁcation systems that assess the user’s context have been presented by
Horvitzandcolleagues(see,e.g.,[8];[9]).Thesesystemsmakeuseofdecision-theoretic
methods to weigh the beneﬁts of a notiﬁcation against the costs (e.g., distraction). Here
again, cognitive load and time pressure are not modeled explicitly.
2.3 Dialog Strategy
Many conversational systems are capable of switching between different dialog styles
depending on the current state of the interaction. For example, [10] describes TOOT, a
prototypespoken dialog system for retrievingonlinetrain schedules. TOOT sometimes
applies a highly conservative dialog strategy in which each piece of required informa-
tion (e.g., destination, place of departure, time of departure) is elicited from the user
through a focused question and then conﬁrmed through a yes-no question. With lessconservativestrategies, S asks moreopen questions that allow U to specify two or more
pieces of informationat a time (e.g.,“How may I help you?”).S decides which strategy
to use on the basis of features of the current dialog, such as the system’s conﬁdence in
the success of its own speech recognition. The main motivation here is to allow users
whose speech can be recognized relatively well to proceed through the dialog quickly,
while still accommodating users whose speech is problematic. But analogous changes
in dialogstrategy couldbe based on assessments of cognitiveload and/or time pressure:
The more conservative strategies may be especially appropriate for users who are cur-
rently distracted by the environmentor by anothertask, whereas they may be especially
frustrating for users under time pressure.
Such hypotheses about the suitability of particular dialog styles for particular con-
ﬁgurations of resource limitations of course require a theoretical and empirical founda-
tion. An effort along these lines was made in a different line of research in the READY
project ([11]): In an experimental setting, each of 24 subjects used a mouse to carry
out spoken instructions regarding a graphical control panel (e.g., “Set X to 3, set M to
1, set V to 4”). In half of the trials, the instructions for a given panel were bundled, as
in the example just given; in the other half of the trials, they were presented stepwise:
After each single instruction (e.g., “Set X to 3”), the system waited until the user had
completed the instruction and clicked on a conﬁrmation button; then the system pre-
sented the next individual instruction. An orthogonal manipulation induced cognitive
load in half of the trials through a secondary task that required subjects to attend to
color changes in one part of the screen.
When instructions were presented bundled, subjects often made errors when a se-
quence comprised 3 or 4 instructions and when they were distracted by a secondary
task. By contrast, the stepwise presentation of instructions was shown to be a slow but
safe strategy, like the conservative dialog strategies discussed above: Subjects made
very few errors even in the most difﬁcult conditions. Given the assumption that users
attach some value to both rapid task completion and the avoidance of errors, it can be
shown that stepwise presentation is on the whole relatively suitable when U is expe-
riencing cognitive load; but that the system’s choice between the two modes should
also be based on the length of the instruction sequence and the relative importance of
executionspeedand erroravoidance.Althoughit was conductedin an artiﬁcial environ-
ment, this study empirically conﬁrms the intuition that differentdialog strategies can be
suitable under different conﬁgurations of resource limitations.
2.4 Other Forms of Adaptation to Resource Limitations
Several other ways in which a conversational interface might adapt to resource limi-
tations should be mentioned brieﬂy for completeness, although they so far have been
instantiated less clearly than the possibilities discussed above.
On the basis of perceived high cognitive load, a system might change its behavior
as follows:
– Present a smaller amountof optional informationthat is not strictly requiredfor the
performance of U’s system-related task.For example, the airport assistant introduced above might stick to basic navigation
instructions while guiding U from one location to another, leaving out information
about airport facilities passed along the way.
– Present information in a style that is optimized for easy understanding, at the ex-
pense of other criteria (such as elegance or conciseness).
Some stylistic features (e.g., simplicity and explicitness) are commonly recom-
mended for texts that are typically read or heard by users who cannot be expected
to be paying full attention, such as error messages and help texts (see, e.g., [3],
chap. 6). The novel idea in an adaptive system is that the degree to which such el-
ements should be included should depend on the perceived level of cognitive load,
because of the tradeoffs with other criteria.
– Adapt the interface in such a way as to prevent errors that are typical of high cog-
nitive load.
A number of categories of expert slip are discussed by Norman ([12]), along with
design remedies. Each such remedy (e.g., makingobjects more visually distinctive;
asking for conﬁrmation) tends to have some drawbacks. Since expert slips are es-
pecially likely when U is environmentally distracted, some remedies may become
worthwhile under high cognitive load even if their drawbacks outweigh their ad-
vantages given low cognitive load.
Analogous suitable responses to time pressure might include the following:
– Present concrete instructions that describe speciﬁc actions, as opposed to encour-
aging U to discover procedures on her own or to form a robust mental model of the
system.
– Optimize messages for speed of presentationand/orcomprehension,if necessary at
the expense of other criteria.
For example, synthesized speech could be played at a faster rate, even though it
might sound less pleasant and require more effort to understand.
3 Ways of Recognizing Resource Limitations
Given that there appears to be some potential beneﬁt to the automatic recognition of
a user’s resource limitations, on the basis of what evidence can a system achieve such
recognition?
3.1 Recognizing Likely Causes of Resource Limitations
A system may be able to recognize factors that tend to give rise to resource limitations
in users. Any evidence that suggests the presence of such a factor constitutes indirect
evidence for the correspondingresource limitation. Table 1 gives some examples of the
many possibilities.Table 1. Examples of ways in which an adaptive system might obtain information about causes
of a user’s resource limitations.
Cause of the resource limitation  Evidence of the cause that may be accessible 
to the adaptive system 
Cognitive load 
Difficult driving situation  Information from navigation system 
Use of a cognitively demanding interactive 
application 
Information about applications currently 
being used by U 
Distracting noise and/or events in the 
environment 
Sensing of the environment through 
microphones or cameras 
Time pressure 
Requirement for fast task completion 
imposed by the environment (e.g., flight for 
which boarding is about to close) 
S’s access to information about 
environment−imposed constraints (e.g., 
boarding schedules) 
Requirement for fast response imposed by S 
itself (e.g., instruction by S to perform a 
given action quickly) 
S’s access to its own processing history 
3.2 Physiological Indicators
Within engineering psychology, there is a long tradition of research on physiological
measures of cognitive load (see, e.g., [13]; [14]). Such measures have mostly been ap-
plied in laboratoryor ﬁeld studies, but there is some potential for using them for on-line
recognition of and adaptation to cognitive load. Two relatively promising measures can
serve as examples:
Heart Rate Variability Heart rate variability (see, e.g., [15]) tends to decrease with
increasing overall mental workload. In a study somewhat similar in spirit to the one to
be described in Sections 6, Rowe et al. ([15]) investigated the potential of heart rate
variability to serve as in index of cognitive load, not only for the purpose of studying
the workload induced by a given system but also for the purpose of allowing automatic
adaptation. While this study did not yet yield clear conclusions about the value of heart
rate variability for supporting on-line adaptation, they did suggest that further investi-
gation of this possibility is warranted. Because of the need to attach electrodes to the
user’s body, heart rate variability does not ﬁt especially naturally into the scenarios of
mobile conversational interfaces; but perhaps ultimately the necessary sensors can be
worn in an unobtrusive way and transmit data to a mobile device.
Pupil Diameter The diameter of a person’s pupil has likewise been shown to vary sys-
tematically as a function of mental load—although it is also strongly affected by other
factors, such as ambient illuminationand the distance of objects being ﬁxated (see, e.g.,
[16]). These other factors would be especially problematic with mobile systems. Pupil
diameter can be measured with eye tracking equipment. With stationary system use, aremote eye tracker can be used that does not have to be attached to the user’s head—
although the user is required to sit relatively still. For mobile use, a head-mounted eye
tracker is required; for the time being, therefore, this type of measurement must be re-
stricted to research studies, as opposed to normal system use. As is the case with heart
rate variability, studies are required to determine whether and in what situations this
type of information can play a useful role in a system that adapts to a user’s resource
limitations.
Astudyconductedwithin READY illustratedthatthatsuccessis notguaranteedeven
in apparently optimal circumstances: In an experiment, Schultheis found no difference
in the pupil diameter of subjects when they were reading very easy vs. very difﬁcult
texts on a computer screen (see, e.g., [17], [18]). A similar negative result was obtained
by Iqbal et al. ([19]) on a simlar reading task, but these same authors obtained good
accuracy results on different types of tasks.
Other Indices Other measures, which seem to have less immediate promise for use
in mobile systems, include those that concern aspects of brain activity (for which, for
example, Schultheis found some promising results in the experiment just mentioned;
see also [20] for more recent and more promising results) and respiratory activity.
Comments One general advantage of physiological measures is that in general a con-
tinuousstreamof datais receivedwithouttheneedforthe user toproduceanyparticular
behavior solely for diagnostic purposes. Some measures, such as heart rate variability
and pupil diameter, respond quickly enough to changes in cognitive load to make on-
line adaptation in principle feasible. A general drawback is the need for specialized
sensors, which users may ﬁnd uncomfortable or restrictive.
3.3 Evidence in the User’s Behavior With the System
A different general class of evidence comprises information about the user’s behavior
in interacting with the system—for example, U’s use of manual input devices or U’s
speech. One positive aspect of these types of evidence is that special sensing devices
may be unnecessary, because the information enters S through the normal input chan-
nels. Moreover, U’s input behavior (e.g., the fact that U is making manual input errors
or producing disﬂuent speech) may be of importance in its own right—that is, a fact
that S might adapt to or take into account in its processing.
Evidence in the User’s Motor Behavior Aspects of a user’s motor behavior (e.g.,
tapping or dragging on a touchscreen with a stylus) could in principle reveal something
abouta user’sresourcelimitations.Agooddealofresearchhas accumulatedconcerning
featuresofmotorbehaviorthattypicallyariseundercognitiveloadand/ortimepressure.
Within the READY project, Lindmark([21])surveyedthese relationships and suggested
how they might be used for automatic recognition of resource limitations. For example,
time pressure tends to lead to an increase in the stiffness of a person’s limbs, which in
turn tends to cause actions like tapping on the screen to be performed with relativelyhigh force ([22]); accordingly, when a given user employs more than the usual amount
of force, this fact can be seen as suggestive evidence of time pressure. Cognitive load
tends to increase the likelihood of expert slips (e.g., forgetting to perform an intended
action; tapping on an icon that looks similar to the intended one; cf. [12]); if the system
can recognize such an error as having been made—in general not a trivial task—it
can use the error as evidence that suggests cognitive load. Some behaviors (such as
the two just mentioned as examples) are made more likely by either cognitive load
or time pressure. Therefore, any mechanism for interpreting such evidence will have
to have some appropriate mechanism for adjusting its hypotheses concerning both of
these resource limitations on the basis of the same evidence. Although the emphasis in
the present chapter is not on inference mechanisms, one possible such mechanism will
be discussed in connection with the analyses in Sections 7 and 8.
Evidence in the User’s Speech With conversational interfaces, an especially natural
type of indicator of resource limitations comprises features of the user’s speech. Be-
cause S needs to process U’s speech anyway, there must already exist some type of
microphone for sensing the speech and some software for analyzing it. Therefore, as
with motor indicators, in the best case the only further requirements concern software
for identifying and interpreting the indicators. The prospects for recognizing resource
limitations on the basis of this type of indicator will be examined in detail starting in
Section 4.
4 Experiments: Introduction
As was argued in 3.3, features of a user’s speech appear in several respects to be a
promising source of information about a user’s cognitive resource limitations. But an
obvious ﬁrst question is: Is there enough information available in a user’s speech to
support a reasonably reliable recognition of these resource limitations?
4.1 Earlier Research on Speech Indicators
Before initiating a time-consuming experimental study, we surveyed previously con-
ducted studies of relations between cognitive load or time pressure and features of
speech.6
Distinction From Other Topics The idea of making inferences about a speaker on
the basis of features of their speech is by no means new. One topic of high practical
importance is the recognition of emotion on the basis of speech (see, e.g., [34]). Part
of this literature focuses on the effects of stress (see, e.g., [35]). Stress is related to
cognitive load and time pressure, in that these resource limitations can be both causes
and consequences of stress. But there are also essential aspects of the concept of stress
that are not necessarily associated with cognitive load or time pressure: physiological
6 Since this survey was made in 1998, it covered work through the late 1990s.Table 2. Overview of the most important indicators of cognitive load found in some early studies.
Indicator  Direction*  Tally**  Example Study 
Output rate 
Articulation rate  −  7/7  Lazarus−Mainka and Arnold 
(1987) 
Speech rate  −  7/7  Kowal and O’Connell (1987) 
Pauses 
Onset latency (duration)  +/(−)  9/11  Greene (1984) 
Silent pauses (number)  +  4/5  Rummer (1996), Exp. 1 and 2 
Silent pauses (duration, all)  +  6/8  Goldman−Eisler (1968) 
Silent pauses (duration, intraphrasal 
only) 
+  2/2  Butterworth (1980) 
Filled pauses (number)  +  4/6  Wiese (1983) 
Filled pauses (duration)  +  1/2  Grosjean and Deschamps (1973) 
Indicators involving output quality 
Repetitions (number)  +  5/6  Deese (1980), Exp. 2 
Sentence fragments (number)  +  4/5  Rummer (1996), Exp. 2 
False starts (number)  +  2/4  Roßnagel (1995) 
Self−corrections (number)***  +, −, 0  2, 1, 4  Oviatt (1995) 
* "+" means that the measure was generally found to increase under conditions of high cognitive 
load; "−" means the opposite. 
** "m/n" means that of n relevant studies, m found the tendency indicated in the second column. (In 
most cases the tendency was statistically significant.) 
*** Results concerning self−corrections show an inconsistent pattern. 
arousal and stressors such as noise or high acceleration (cf. [3], chap. 12). We believe
that it can be important to be able to adapt to cognitive load or time pressure even
when these factors are not present—for example,when the user is performingtwo tasks
at once and would like to proceed quickly but is not especially concerned about the
consequencesoffailure.We thereforefocushereonpreviousstudiesthatdidnotinvolve
especially stressful situations. (A much more detailed and comprehensive analysis of
studies like these is given by [1].)
Effects of Cognitive Load With regard to cognitive load, a number of features of
speech have been investigated in multiple studies; hence it is possible to draw some
fairly general conclusions concerningtheir dependence on cognitive load. Table 2 sum-
marizes the most important of these indicators.
Effects of Time Pressure Perhaps surprisingly, the number of results that can be
extracted from previous studies concerningthe effects of time pressure is much smallerthan the number for cognitive load. One of the more obvious hypotheses is that people
speak more quickly under time pressure. This hypothesis was conﬁrmed in a study
by Kelley and Stone ([36]), and a study by Marx ([37]) showed a marginal tendency
of the same sort. This same study by Marx revealed a statistically signiﬁcantly greater
tendencyofspeakerswhohadbeenputundertimepressuretorepeatparts ofutterances.
5 Experimental Method
5.1 Purpose of Experiments
The goals of our two experiments were (a) to ﬁll the gap in knowledge concerning the
impact of time pressure on features of speech; (b) to examine within a single setting
a large number of features that had previously mostly been studied separately; and (c)
to obtain raw data that could be used to determine how well cognitive load and time
pressure can be recognized on the basis of speech.
We required some way of capturing users’ speech while they are subject to known
resource limitations. In principle it would be possible to capture the speech in fairly
natural conditions, if we could conﬁdently assess the resource limitations in these con-
ditions. Healy and Picard ([38]) applied this strategy in their study of physiological
assessment of driver stress: Subjects were required to drive along a route that included
a number of events which had predictable stress levels.
We chose an experimental setting for our studies, so as to be able to exert greater
control over both the independent variables and the nature of the speech utterances.
We conductedtwoexperiments,separatedbyabout1yearintime;Experiment2can
be seen as a replication and extension of Experiment1. For concreteness, Experiment1
will be described separately ﬁrst.
5.2 Method for Experiment 1
Materials Theexperimentalenvironmentsimulated a situationin which a user is walk-
ing through a crowded airport terminal while asking questions to a mobile assistance
system via speech (see Figure 2). In each of 80 trials, a picture appeared in the upper
right-hand corner of the screen. On the basis of each picture, the subject was to ask a
question, after motivating it with an introductorysentence. For example, for the picture
shownin Figure 2, a subject mightsay “I’m gettingthirsty.Is there ...will it be possible
to get a beer on the plane?”.
Design Two independent variables were manipulated orthogonally:
– NAVIGATION: whether or not the subject was required to move an icon on the
screen through the depicted terminal to an assigned destination by pressing arrow
keys, while avoiding obstacles and rememberinga gate number that comprised ﬁve
digits and one letter. When navigation was not required, the subject could ignore
the depicted terminal and concentrate on the generation of appropriate utterances
in response to the pictures.Fig.2. Environment used in the experiments, with a typical pictorial stimulus.
The navigation task was designed to induce the sort cognitive load that would be
induced by a nonverbal task performed by the user of a mobile system while in-
teracting with the system. Walking around an airport would be one example of
such a task; but there are of course differences between (a) walking in a real three-
dimensionalspaceand(b)movinganabstractﬁgurewithinatwo-dimensionalcom-
puter screen. We do not refer to this condition as the “cognitive load” condition
because it is not known to what extent the task actually induces cognitive load in
any given subject.
– SPEECH TIME PRESSURE: whether the subject was induced by instructions and
rewards (a) to ﬁnish each utterance as quickly as possible or (b) to create an
especially clear and comprehensible utterance, without regard to time.
More speciﬁcally, in the condition with time pressure, the subject was told that his
speech would be interpreted by an experienced airport assistant who was in great
demand because of her extensive knowledge. Utterances directed to this assistant
were to be completedquickly,so that she couldgo on to assist other airportvisitors.
In the condition without time pressure, subjects were to direct their utterances to a
new, inexperienced airport assistant. In this condition, nothing was said about time
limitations; the emphasis was to be on ensuring that this assistant understood the
utterances.
TheinstructionsconcerningSPEECH TIME PRESSURE makeit almostinevitablefor
some differences in the speech of the subjects to appear as a function of this variable.
Still,thereareempiricalquestionsconcerning(a)theparticularformsthattheutterances
take in the two conditions(e.g.,whether,under SPEECH TIME PRESSURE, subjects will
articulate more quickly, use fewer words, and/or think less before starting to speak);
and (b) whether the differences will be large enough to allow accurate discrimination
between the two conditions.We call this second variable SPEECH TIME PRESSURE to highlight its differences
from other possible forms of time pressure. For example, if a person’s goal is the quick
completion of some larger task (e.g., getting to the departure gate), they may or may
not try to save time by completing individual utterances quickly. But time pressure
with regard to utterance completion can arise for various other reasons as well—for
example, because of real or imagined time limitations on the part of the listener or
system; because of a task that the user is performingthat leaves only brief intervals free
for speaking; or because of a high cost of utterances to the speaker, as in the case of
an expensive communication channel. Any attempt to have a system adapt to SPEECH
TIME PRESSURE in a given setting should take into account the likely reasons for this
form of time pressure that might apply in that setting.
Procedure After an extensive introduction to the scenario, the environment, and the
4 (2 × 2) conditions, each subject dealt with 4 blocks of trials, each block involving
20 pictures distributed over 4 destinations. Each block was presented in one of the 4
conditions, the order being varied across subjects according to standard procedures.
Subjects The 32 subjects, students at Saarland University, were paid for their partic-
ipation. An extra reward was given to one of the participants who most successfully
followed the instructions regarding the time pressure manipulation.
Coding and Ratingof Speech Each of the 2560(32×80)utterances was transliterated
and coded with respect to a wide range of features, including almost all of those that
had been included in previous published studies. On the basis of the transliterations
(minus the coding symbols), four independent raters sorted the stimulus pictures into
5 categories in terms of the complexity of the responses that they tended to call for.
An aggregation of these ratings was later used to control for the different degrees of
difﬁculty of the speech tasks invoked by the pictures.
In this chapter, we report results only for a subset of seven indicators which, on the
basis of the results, seem most promising as indicators of cognitive load and/or time
pressure:7
– NUMBER OF SYLLABLES: The number of syllables in the utterance.
– ARTICULATION RATE: The numberof syllables articulated per second of speaking
time, after elimination of the time for measurable silent pauses.
– SILENT PAUSES: The total duration of the silent pauses in the utterance, expressed
relative to the length of the utterance in words (to take into account the fact that
longer utterances offer more opportunities for pauses). In accordance with usual
practice, a silent pause is deﬁned as a silence within the utterance that lasts for at
least 200 ms.
– FILLED PAUSES: The corresponding measure for ﬁlled pauses (e.g., “Uhh”).
– HESITATIONS: The number of silences with a duration of less than 200 ms, again
relative to the length of the utterance in words.
7 Much more detailed reports covering all of the variables are given by M¨ uller ([39], for Exper-
iment 1) and by Kiefer ([40], for Experiment 2).No
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Fig.3. Visualization of the eight conditions realized in Experiments 1 (left) and 2 (right). (In the
experiments, the time pressure concerned speciﬁcally the time available to generate spoken input
to the mobile system.)
– ONSET LATENCY: The length of the time interval between the presentation of the
pictorial stimulus and the ﬁrst syllable spoken by the subject.
– DISFLUENCIES: The logical disjunction of several binary variables, each of which
indexes one type of speech disﬂuency: self-corrections involving either syntax or
content; false starts; or interrupting speech in the middle of a sentence or a word.
Although each of these variables has been treated as a separate dependent variable
in some previousstudies, theyare groupedtogetherherebecause eachphenomenon
in question occurs too infrequently in our data to give rise to statistically reliable
effects. (Filled and silent pauses, which may also be regarded as disﬂuencies, are
not counted here, because they are treated as separate variables.)
5.3 Method for Experiment 2
The method for Experiment 2 was identical to that for Experiment 1, with one excep-
tion: During all of the time in which a subject was performing the experimental tasks,
they heard through a headphone prerecorded loudspeaker announcements of the sort
thattravelerstypicallyhearatairportterminals(concerningmatterssuchas ﬂight depar-
tures, gate changes, missing persons, and security warnings). These German-language
announcements, which had been recorded at Frankfurt Airport, were arranged digitally
so that there were only minimal pauses between announcements. For our present pur-
poses, the functionof these announcementswas to addan additionalsource ofcognitive
load—one which, in contrast to the navigation task, seemed likely to interfere more di-
rectly with the process of speech production, because of its verbal nature.
Figure 3 gives a graphical overview of the eight speciﬁc conditions that were real-
ized in the two experiments. Our focus will be on the effects that occurred within eachNo  Yes  Navigation? 
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Fig.4. Means for the variable NUMBER OF SYLLABLES in the four conditions of Experiment 1
(left) and Experiment 2 (right).
experiment. Although it is of some theoretical interest to see how the announcements
affected speech production, in the present chapter we will not pay much attention to a
comparison of the results with and without announcements. One reason is that there is
little practicalinterestattachedtothequestionofwhetherasystemcanrecognize,onthe
basis of a user’s speech, whether that user is being distracted by irrelevant speech from
the environment: If U’s speech can be picked up by a microphone,then presumably the
presenceofambientspeechcouldbe directlydetectedvia the microphoneas well. Also,
from a methodological point of view, we must be cautious in interpreting speciﬁc dif-
ferences between the results of Experiments 1 and 2: Even though considerable effort
was made to replicate the method of Experiment 1, for practical reasons Experiment 2
was conducted by a different experimenter and the utterances were transliterated by a
differentresearcher.Moreover,thesubjects werenotnecessarilysampledfromthesame
population. It is therefore most realistic to focus on the robust results which are found
in both of the experiments despite the differences between them.
6 Experimental Results
6.1 Statistical Analyses
For each of the indicators analyzed here, a three-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
was conducted, with two within-subject variables (NAVIGATION and SPEECH TIME
PRESSURE) and one between-subject variable (ANNOUNCEMENTS).8 In accordance
8 Before the ANOVAs were conducted, multivariate analyses of variance had been conducted
with a view to ensuring against capitalizing on chance with the relatively large number of
ANOVAs; these MANOVAs demonstrated that the interpretation of the ANOVAs reported
here is justiﬁed.with the considerations just mentioned, we will interpret only the main effects of the
within-subject variables and the interactions between them.
6.2 Number of Syllables
Figure 4 shows the means for the variable NUMBER OF SYLLABLES for each of the
eight conditions. The ANOVA conﬁrms that there is a highly signiﬁcant main effect
of SPEECH TIME PRESSURE (F(1,63) = 97.573,p < 0.001): Not surprisingly, the
instruction to ﬁnish each utterance quickly led to a much smaller number of syllables
per utterance.
Somewhat less obviously, the requirement to navigate led to somewhat shorter ut-
terances (F(1,63) = 8.295,p < 0.01). Although there is no signiﬁcant interaction
between the two independent variables, the graphs suggest, plausibly, that the differ-
ence arises mainly in the condition without time pressure, in which the subjects were
less ambitious with regard to the goal of producing unambiguous, high-quality utter-
ances. When they were under time pressure, they were trying to keep their utterances
short even when not navigating,so there was little room for the navigation task to cause
further reduction in their length.
The results concerning NUMBER OF SYLLABLES are novel for the simple reason
that previous studies have not in general included utterance length as a dependent vari-
able. A likely reason for this omission is that utterance length has diagnostic signif-
icance only relative to a particular speech task: The fact that a user has produced a
15-syllable utterance in itself says little about her cognitive state; but if we know that
the utterance was produced as an answer to a straightforward yes/no question, it may
be signiﬁcant. We will see in 7.1 how the properties of the current speech task can be
taken into account in the interpretation of speech indicators.
6.3 Articulation Rate
As can be seen in Figure 5, on the average subjects producedmore syllables per second
when they were under time pressure than when they were not (F(1,63) = 47.726,p <
0.001). Though this result is intuitively plausible, it is not logically necessary, given
that there are other ways of copingwith time pressure (cf. 4.1). There is also a tendency
to articulate less quickly when navigating (see the slope of the two lines; F(1,63) =
4.355,p < 0.05),ashasbeenreportedinanumberofpreviousstudies(cf.Table2).This
effect is stronger under time pressure; this interaction (F(1,63) = 5.565,p < 0.05) is
understandable in that, under time pressure, subjects are articulating relatively fast, so
there is more room for them to slow down.
The fact that the two main effects and the interaction are statistically signiﬁcant,
even though the differences involving ARTICULATION RATE do not appear visually
striking in the graphs, testiﬁes to the precision and sensitivity of ARTICULATION RATE
as an index.
6.4 Silent Pauses
The results for SILENT PAUSES (Figure 6) are complex. It is easily understandable
that there is a highly signiﬁcant main effect of SPEECH TIME PRESSURE (F(1,63) =No  Yes  Navigation? 
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27.689,p < 0.001):Without such pressure, subjects have no motivationto save time by
avoiding pauses; perhaps even more importantly, they are motivated to produce high-
quality utterances, which presumably tend to call for more careful planning, which
can be accomplished during pauses. In particular, we have already seen (Figure 4) that
utterances produced without time pressure tend to be considerably longer; and as was
shown by Oviatt ([41]), longer utterances tend to be associated with a relatively high
number of disﬂuencies such as silent pauses.
Regardingthe effects of NAVIGATION, previousstudies (cf.Table 2) hadshownthat
a concurrenttask tends to increasethe numberand/orlengthof silent pauses—plausibly
enough, since a concurrent task demands the subjects’ attention at least intermittently.No  Yes  Navigation? 
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This pattern is in fact seen in the upward slope of three of the four lines in Figure 6.
The reason why there is no signiﬁcant overall main effect of NAVIGATION is that a
sharp decrease occurs in Experiment 1 when there is no time pressure. This decline is
understandablewhen we recall that, without time pressure, the need to navigateleads to
shorter utterances (Figure 4). In other words, subjects’ adaptation to the navigationtask
proves more important in this case than the tendency of this task to increase cognitive
load.
This speciﬁc result reminds us of a general point that is often emphasized in re-
search on the effects of resource limitations on behavior (see, e.g., [3], chap. 11; [42]).
Resource limitations do not in general have a direct and unavoidable impact on perfor-
mance; typically, a person has some freedom to decide how to deal with them.
6.5 Filled Pauses
With the indicator FILLED PAUSES (Figure 7), the most striking difference between
the two experiments appears. In Experiment 1 we see an effect that had been found
in previous studies (cf. Table 2): an increase in ﬁlled pauses when a concurrent task
is added. With the addition of the loudspeaker announcements in Experiment 2, this
relatively subtle effect is reduced as the total duration of ﬁlled pauses increases by a
factor of about 3; overall, there is no signiﬁcant main effect of NAVIGATION. Although
it is plausible that subjects generate more ﬁlled pauses in order to blockout the distract-
ing loudspeaker announcements, we should not attach much weight to this difference
between the experiments, for the reasons given in 5.3.
6.6 Hesitations
The very short pauses counted by the variable HESITATIONS (Figure 8) occur signiﬁ-
cantly less frequently when the subject is navigating (F(1,63) = 8.407,p < 0.01); aNo  Yes  Navigation? 
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possible explanation for this phenomenonis in terms of the reduction in the complexity
of utterances when the subject is navigating(cf. Section 6.4). This result is novel in that
virtually no previous studies have looked at hesitations as a dependent variable. The
apparent effect of time pressure in the graphs is not statistically reliable, but note that it
would be consistent with the results for SILENT PAUSES (6.4).
6.7 Onset Latency
Regarding ONSET LATENCY (Figure 9), we see a highly signiﬁcant tendency for sub-
jects to begin with the production of their utterance sooner when they have been in-No  Yes  Navigation? 
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Fig.10. Means for the variable DISFLUENCIES in the four conditions of Experiment 1 (left) and
Experiment 2 (right).
structed to get ﬁnished with the utterance quickly (F(1,63) = 95.841,p < 0.001).
In addition to the obvious explanation that they are simply following instructions, this
effect may be due in part to the lower complexity of the utterances produced under
time pressure (cf. 6.2), which reduces the amount of planning required. The tendency
(suggested by the lack of parallelism in the lines of each graph) for ONSET LATENCY
to be affected more by NAVIGATION when there is SPEECH TIME PRESSURE is con-
ﬁrmed by a signiﬁcant statistical interaction between the two independent variables
(F(1,63) = 8.079,p < 0.05). The positive impact of cognitive load on onset latency
that was found in many previous studies (see Table 2) is not found here to a statistically
signiﬁcant degree, although there is a visible tendency in that direction.
6.8 Disﬂuencies
Although each of the speciﬁc types of disﬂuency summarized by the variable DISFLU-
ENCIES occurstooinfrequentlyto yieldstatistically signiﬁcantdifferencesas a function
of the independent variables, a robust tendency does appear for the disjunction of the
speciﬁc variables: As can be seen in Figure 10, DISFLUENCIES increase when the sub-
ject is required to navigate (F(1,63) = 8.403,p < 0.01, as was shown in previous
studies (cf. Table 2). The other tendency that is apparent in the ﬁgure—for disﬂuencies
to increase when there is no time pressure—is not statistically reliable in these data,
though it would be consistent with the greater complexity of utterances generated when
there is no time pressure (cf. [41]).
6.9 Discussion
We have seen that, with the exception of FILLED PAUSES, each of the dependent vari-
ables discussed here shows one statistically reliable effect of time pressure and/or thenavigation task. As was mentioned above, some of these results replicate and extend
ﬁndings from previous experimental research, while others yield new information—
especially those that concern the independent variable of SPEECH TIME PRESSURE
and its interactions with the presence of a concurrent task.
Takentogether,these results suggestthat observationofthese variablesin a person’s
speech might allow a system to infer that person’s current resource limitations. But the
question of the extent to which such recognition is possible is not directly addressed by
the conventionalanalyses that we have presentedso far: A statistically signiﬁcant result
inanANOVAshowsthattheresultis unlikelytohaveoccurredbecauseofchancealone,
but it does not guarantee that the dependent variable in question will have diagnostic
value. To determine the prospects for recognizing resource limitations, we will apply
quite different methods in the following two sections.
7 Learning of User Models
If we want to create a system that recognizes the resource limitations of its users on the
basis of their speech, we need to take two main steps:
1. Use machine learning methods to create some sort of model relating resource limi-
tations to speech indicators, using data such as those of these experiments (see the
rest of this section).
2. Apply this model to the data of each user, using the features of their speech as
evidence (Section 8).
7.1 Bayesian Network Structure
Regarding Step 1: There exists a great variety of machine learning techniques for clas-
sifying cases on the basis of their features, including support vector machines, neural
networks, decision trees, and case-based reasoning.9 A system that aims to recognize
dynamically changing resource limitations imposes the following requirements on its
learning and inference methods:
– The method should make it possible to interpret evidence from qualitatively dif-
ferent sources (cf. Section 3), ranging from likely causes of resource limitations to
various types of indicator.
– The method should do justice to the fact that, while resource limitations change
over time, the cognitive state of a user at any one moment will in most cases be
similar to his or her state at the previous moment.
– The modeling method should yield a more or less interpretable model: Especially
when several qualitatively different types of evidence are being used, it should be
possible, by inspection of the model, to understand their relationships to one an-
other (cf. [46]). Otherwise, it may be difﬁcult to adapt the method to scenarios that
involve different types of evidence.
9 For general treatments of machine learning techniques, see [43]; [44]. Applications of such
techniques to the modeling of computer users are discussed in [45].  
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– It should be possible to acquire a model of each individual user, so as to be able
to take into account individual differences in the ways in which resource limita-
tions are reﬂected in speech. But user model acquisition should also be able to take
advantage of data acquired from users other than the current user, so that learning
does not have to begin from scratch with each new user (cf. [47]).
Among the learning and inference techniques that best ﬁt this combination of re-
quirements are those that are associated with Bayesian networks (BNs).10
The BN structure employed in the present study is illustrated in Figure 11. (The
nodes in the lower box labeled TIME SLICE 2 can be ignored for the moment.) We
will ﬁrst considerits qualitative structure; the quantitative modelingof the relationships
among the variables represented will be discussed below.
The three nodes NAVIGATION, SPEECH TIME PRESSURE, and ANNOUNCEMENTS
on the left correspond to the three main independent variables of the experiments. The
10 The technical aspects of the use of Bayesian networks in the READY project, with a focus on
the learning of BNs, are discussed in the chapter by Wittig in this volume.node DIFFICULTY OF SPEECH TASK refers to the rated complexity of the speech task
created by the stimulus picture(cf. Section 5). Each of these nodes representsa variable
that can be seen as inﬂuencing the values of the seven dependent (indicator) variables
that were analyzed in Section 6; these variables are represented by the seven nodes on
the right within the box for TIME SLICE 1. Further inﬂuences on the indicatorvariables
are represented by the seven nodes on the far right in the ﬁgure, which correspond to
individual base rates for the seven indicator variables. They are introduced to take into
account individual differences in the overall level of the indicator variables. The value
of each such variable is constant for each U: It is simply computed as the mean value
of the variable in question for the entire experiment.
The BN structure in the ﬁgure shows a rather drastic simpliﬁcation of the causal
relationships that actually exist between the variables in question. For example, the ab-
sence of links among the base rate variables implies that these variables are statistically
independent. In addition to being implausible, this assumption was shown to be false
by our own factor analyses and applications of algorithms for learning BN structures
from data. Nonetheless, this simpliﬁed model was found to performbetter at the task of
recognizinga speaker’stime pressureandcognitiveloadthan didmorecomplexmodels
that took into account the statistical dependencies.11
Our question in the evaluation study will be: If a user U produces a sequence of
utterances in a given experimental condition, how well can a system S recognize what
condition the user was in? Therefore, the variables NAVIGATION and SPEECH TIME
PRESSURE can be viewed here as static variables whose value does not change over
time. The seven base rate variables are also static. By contrast, each of the variables
insidetheboxeslabeled TIME SLICE 1 and TIME SLICE 2 referstoanaspect ofjust one
utterance. Hence correspondingtemporary nodes need to be created for each utterance.
We are therefore dealing with a dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) that comprises a
series of time slices.12
7.2 Quantitative Parameters
In a BN such is the one used here, which does not include continuous variables, each
variable has 2 or more discrete states, or possible values. For example, for NAVIGA-
TION, the two states are “Navigation” and “No navigation”. For the base rate vari-
able BASE RATE FOR NUMBER OF SYLLABLES, each state corresponds to one of four
ranges of numbers of syllables.
For each root node (i.e., a node that has no links directed at it), the system’s ini-
tial expectation about the value of the variable in question is represented by a vector
of probabilities that represents a probability distribution. For example, for each of the
nodes SPEECH TIME PRESSURE, NAVIGATION, and ANNOUNCEMENTS, the probabil-
ities are simply <.50, .50>, reﬂecting the fact that each value of each of these variables
11 A possible reason is that in the more complex models the estimates of some probabilities in
the learned BN are less accurate because they are based on relatively few observations.
12 An explanation of the general principles of dynamic Bayesian networks can be found, for
example, in chap. 17 of [48]. A discussion with regard to user modeling of the sort done here
is given by [49].occurred equally often in the experiments. For each of the base rate nodes, the proba-
bility vector reﬂects the empirically determined distribution of the base rate in question
in the group of subjects in these experiments.
For each node that is not a root node, a conditional probability table (CPT) rep-
resents the system’s assumptions about how the value of the variable is related to the
values of its parent variables (corresponding to the nodes with links that point to it).
For example, each probability in the CPT for DISFLUENCIES represents the likelihood
that a disﬂuency will occur (or not occur) in an utterance, given particular values of the
parent variables SPEECH TIME PRESSURE, NAVIGATION, ANNOUNCEMENTS, DIFFI-
CULTY OF SPEECH TASK, and BASE RATE FOR DISFLUENCIES.
A BN makes probabilistic inferences when it is evaluated: Typically, one or more
variables in the BN are instantiated; that is, the probability distribution representing
the system’s belief about the value of such a variable is replaced by a probability dis-
tribution which expresses certainty that one particular value is realized. Then the BN
is reevaluated; typically the system’s beliefs about some of the uninstantiated variables
are updated to be consistent with the new information provided by the instantiations.
7.3 Learning the Quantitative Parameters
Although we speciﬁed the structure of the BN shown in Figure 11 by hand, the prob-
abilities need to be learned empirically. Such learning is quite straightforward in a BN
(such as this one) that includes only observable variables: In accordance with the usual
maximum-likelihoodmethod (see, e.g., [50]), the estimate of each (conditional) proba-
bility is computed simply in terms of the (relative) frequencies in the data.13
Since we want to test a learned BN model with the data of a given user U, we must
not include U’s data in the data that are used for the learning of the corresponding BN.
Accordingly, we learned for each U the conditional probability tables for a separate
BN using the data from the other 63 subjects. The learned BN has the structure shown
in Figure 11 minus the nodes shown for TIME SLICE 2; the CPTs for the temporary
variables within each time slice are the same as the ones learned for TIME SLICE 1.
8 Evaluation of the User Models
8.1 Procedure
The basic idea of the evaluation of the learned models can be explained with reference
to Figure 3: Given the behavior of a subject in one of the eight experimentalconditions,
our system will try to infer which condition the subject was in when he or she produced
that behavior.More speciﬁcally,when asking the system to assess the probabilitythat U
was under time pressure, we will tell the system whether U was navigatingand whether
U was distracted by loudspeaker announcements. Similarly, when asking the system to
assess the probabilitythat U was navigating,we will specify the true values of the other
two independent variables. (We will not report on tests of how well S can discriminate
13 The learning of BNs in much more complex settings is discused in the chapter by Wittig in
this volume.Table 3. Procedure used in evaluating the accuracy with which a learned Bayesian network as-
sesses the value of the variable SPEECH TIME PRESSURE for a given user. (The procedure is
identical when the value of NAVIGATION is to be assessed, except that the roles of T and N are
interchanged.)
Relevant variables and their values 
•  A user U 
•  Values t, n, and a of the Boolean variables T (Speech Time Pressure), N (Navigation), 
and A (Announcements) 
Task 
Infer the value of T on the basis of indicators in U’s speech 
Preparation of the test data 
Select the 20 observations for U in which T = t, N = n, and a = A, in the order in which 
they occurred in the experiment in question 
Evaluating recognition accuracy 
Initialize the model: 
1.  Create the first time slice of the BN for U 
2.  Instantiate each of the individual base rate variables with its true value for U 
3.  Also instantiate N and A with their true values n and a, but leave the variable T 
(whose value is to be inferred) uninstantiated 
For each observation O in the set of observations for U: 
1.  In the newest time slice of the BN, derive a belief about T: 
•  Instantiate all of the temporary variables for this time slice with their values in O 
•  Evaluate the BN to arrive at a belief regarding T 
•  Note the probability assigned at this point to the true value t of T 
2.  Add a new time slice to the dynamic BN to prepare for the next observation 
between the presence and the absence of ANNOUNCEMENTS, for the reasons given in
5.3, except to note in passing that the results are roughly comparable to those reported
below for the recognition of NAVIGATION.)
More formally, the procedure for evaluating a learned BN is given in Table 3.
8.2 Results
Because of the differences between Experiments 1 and 2 (cf. 5.3), in Figure 12 the
results ofthe modelingevaluationareshownseparatelyforeachofthetwo experiments.
Each curve is the result of averaging 32 curves, one for each subject in the experiment
in question.14
RecognizingTime Pressure Lookingﬁrst at the results for recognizingSPEECH TIME
PRESSURE (left-hand graphs), we see that the BNs are on the whole rather successful:
The average probability assigned to the actual current condition rises sharply during
14 The results for individual subjects are much less smooth than these aggregated results: The
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Fig.12. Accuracy of the learned dynamic Bayesian networks in inferring the correct value of
SPEECH TIME PRESSURE (“T”, left) and NAVIGATION (“N”, right) in Experiment 1 (above)
and Experiment 2 (below). (Each curve shows the aggregated results for one combination of
values of the variables SPEECH TIME PRESSURE, NAVIGATION, and ANNOUNCEMENTS. In
each curve, the point for the ith observation shows the average probability which the Bayesian
network assigned to the subject’s actual condition after processing the ﬁrst i observations.)the ﬁrst few observations. Note that in each experiment, recognition of SPEECH TIME
PRESSURE is easier when there is no navigation task.15 This result is understandablein
thelightoftheconventionalanalysesdiscussedinSection6:Onthewhole,theeffectsof
time pressure were somewhat greater when there was no navigation task (i.e., the lines
tended to be farther apart on the left-hand sides of the graphs), since in that condition
speakers were able to respond more sensitively to the time pressure (or lack of it).
Recognizing Navigation In Experiment 2, the results for recognition of NAVIGATION
are consistent over the four conditions: After several observations, the system on the
average assigns a probability of roughly 0.65 to the correct condition. The fact that
this probability never rises much above 0.70, even after 20 observations, shows that
there is an inherent difﬁculty in discriminating between the presence and absence of
NAVIGATION which cannot be overcome through the provision of a large number of
observations.
In Experiment 1, the results are generally poorer, and they show rather strange vari-
ations between conditions and over time.16 One way of understandingthe better results
for Experiment 2 is simply to note that the indicators shown in Figures 6 through 10
tend to occur to a greater extent in Experiment 2 (i.e., the lines in the right-hand graphs
in these ﬁgures tend to be higher than those in the left-hand graphs). Since these indi-
cators are on the whole low-frequency events, any increase in their frequency is likely
to make recognition more accurate. It may be speculated that this overall difference
in the frequency of indicators is due to the presence of loudspeaker announcements in
Experiment 2, which push subjects closer to the limits of their processing capacity.
Dispensing With Individual Indicators Especially when we consider the practical
problem of measuring indicators automatically (see 8.3), it becomes interesting to con-
sider which of the seven indicators might be dispensable on the grounds that they do
not add signiﬁcantly to the accuracy of recognition. We repeated the simulations sum-
marized in Figure 12 seven times, each time leaving out one of the seven indicators.
Since it would be tedious and imprecise to examine seven further sets of four graphs
similar to those shown in Figure 12, we computed for each graph a single number that
summarizes the success of recognition: the mean of the 80 probabilities shown in the
four curves of the graph. The question then becomes: To what extent do these mean
probabilities decline when one of the indicator variables is left out of consideration?
Table 4 shows the results. The indicator whose removal has the greatest impact
is clearly NUMBER OF SYLLABLES. Each of the other indicators seems surprisingly
15 Since this statement applies to each of the observations 1 through 20 in each experiment, the
difference is statistically reliable for each experiment with p < .001 by a sign test.
16 As was mentioned in an earlier report on Experiment 1 ([2]), the results for the recognition of
navigation are actually better if the system is not told whether U was under time pressure—
perhaps because the BN then bases its assessment on a larger number of conditional probabil-
ities and hence, indirectly, on a larger amount of data from other subjects. Overall, however,
there is no systematic tendency for recognition to be better or worse when the system is told
the value of the independent variable(s) that it is not trying to assess.Table 4. Impact on recognition accuracy of leaving out of consideration each of the seven indi-
cator variables. (Each number in the column “All Indicators” is the mean of the 80 probabilities
shown in the corresponding graph in Figure 12, expressed as a percentage. Each number in a
column to the right (except the rightmost column) shows the corresponding mean change in ac-
curacy (as a percentage, but in absolute terms) when the simulation is performed without use of
the indicator variable in question. The rightmost column shows the sum of these changes.)
   All 
Indicators 
Syl- 
la- 
bles 
Arti- 
cula- 
tion 
Rate 
Filled 
Pauses 
Hesi- 
ta- 
tions 
Onset 
Laten- 
cy 
Dis- 
fluen- 
cies 
Sil- 
ent 
Pauses 
Sum of 
Changes 
Speech Time Pressure: 
Experiment 1  75.76  −6.13  .00  −.09  +.07  −3.61  +.36  +1.12  −8.29 
Experiment 2  70.32  −5.86  −1.17  −1.21  −.60  −.18  −.04  −.04  −9.10 
Navigation: 
Experiment 1  56.58  −1.86  −.66  −2.02  −.29  +1.39  +.12  −.99  −4.31 
Experiment 2  66.51  −4.94  −1.11  −.84  −.54  −.35  −.03  +.44  −7.39 
dispensable; and in a few cases leaving an indicator out even improves recognition ac-
curacy. As the ﬁnal column shows, the sum of the changes that result from leaving
individual indicators out is much smaller than the extent to which recognition exceeds
the chance level of 50%. This fact shows that the contributions of the indicators are not
simplyadditive:Itmaybepossibletoleaveoutoneindicatorwithoutmuchlossofaccu-
racy because the information that it contributes is largely supplied by other indicators;
but it would not be advisable to leave out all or most of them.
The indicator that it would presumably be most practically useful to omit is DIS-
FLUENCIES: Automatically recognizing linguistic phenomena such as self-corrections,
false starts, and interrupted sentences is considerably more difﬁcult than measuring
(silent or ﬁlled) pauses and counting syllables, which is all that is required for the other
indicators.17 As Table 4 shows, the variable DISFLUENCIES adds at best negligible
value, provided that the other indicators are available.
8.3 Discussion
One question concerns the extent to which the results concerning the recognition of re-
sourcelimitations can be generalizedto different(andmorerealistic) settings. Certainly
the speciﬁc probabilities of correct recognition are dependent on features of the partic-
ular situation—witness the differences that arose even between these two very similar
experiments. For our analyses, it was certainly helpful that the experimental situation
was highly constrained. Moreover, it was important for the system to know the difﬁ-
culty of the speciﬁc speech task that the user was performing. In an interactive system,
the corresponding information would consist in expectations about the complexity of
17 Portable hardware (with associated software) for detecting and analyzing pauses in speech is
commercially available.the utterance that the user is likely to produce in any given situation (for example, after
a question about the user’s desired destination).
Insum,muchworkremainstobedonebeforefeaturesin auser’sspeechcanbeused
forthe recognitionofthe resourcelimitationsof a real user of aninteractivesystem; and
even in the long run this possibility will probablybe subject to various restrictions—for
example, concerning the predictability of the speech produced by users.
9 Summary of Contributions and Remaining Work
One goal of the present chapter was to provide a framework for thinking about the
prospects for adapting to a user’s cognitive resource limitations in interactive systems
in general and in mobile conversational systems in particular. We discussed why such
adaptation might be worthwhile, what forms it might take, and how the resource limi-
tations might be automatically assessed.
The more speciﬁc goal was to explore the prospects of exploiting the user’s speech
as a source of evidencefor the recognitionof resource limitations. One respect in which
the two experiments presented differ from comparable previous experiments concerns
the numberof independentvariables examinedsimultaneously:Whereas almost all pre-
vious studies had examined the effects of just one variable (usually cognitive load), our
experiments orthogonallymanipulated cognitiveload and speech time pressure, as well
as repeatingtheexperimentwithandwithoutdistractionfromirrelevantspeech.Thena-
ture of the manipulations makes the experiments somewhat more relevant to scenarios
of mobile conversational interaction than previous experiments were. But the most im-
portant new contribution concerns the results on the diagnostic value of seven speciﬁc
features of speech: The evaluation experiments show that these indicators together do
permit a degree of recognition of time pressure and cognitive load that could be useful
in some situations, and they indicate the effects of leaving out individual features that
would be relatively hard to recognize automatically.
Any attempt to apply the ideas and results from this chapter in a particular applica-
tion scenario will necessarily involve considerable further work and creativity. But we
believe that the results presented here will be helpful as a starting point.
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